TY  - GEN
AU  - Casella,Alessandra
TI  - Storable votes: protecting the minority voice 
SN  - 0195309081 (pbk. : alk. paper)
AV  - JF1001 .C24 2012
PY  - 2012///
CY  - New York
PB  - Oxford University Press
KW  - Seçimler
KW  - Matematiksel modeller
KW  - Elections
KW  - Mathematical models
KW  - Oy verme
KW  - Voting
KW  - Karar verme
KW  - etuturkob
KW  - Decision making
N1  - Includes bibliographical references (p. 333-337) and index; Machine generated contents note: pt. 1 The Idea -- 1.The Simple Logic of Storable Votes -- 1.1.The Theory -- 1.2.The Experiment -- 1.3.Conclusions -- 2.Storing Votes over Time -- 2.1.The Theory -- 2.2.The Experiment -- 2.3.The Results -- 2.4.Conclusions -- 3.Protecting Minorities without Sacrificing Efficiency -- 3.1.The Theory -- 3.2.The Experiment -- 3.3.The Results -- 3.4.Conclusions -- 4.Agenda Control -- 4.1.Controlling the Order of the Agenda -- 4.2.Controlling the Content of the Agenda -- 4.3.Conclusions -- 5.Storable Votes in Large Elections -- 5.1.The Theory -- 5.2.Symmetric Scenarios -- 5.3.Asymmetric Scenarios -- 5.4.Multiple Bonus Votes -- 5.5.Related Referendums -- 5.6.Conclusions -- 6.A Field Test of Storable Votes in Large Elections: Student Elections on the Columbia Campus -- 6.1.The Test -- 6.2.Estimating the Probable Impact of the Bonus Vote -- 6.3.Conclusions -- 7.Conclusions -- pt. 2 The Proofs -- 1.The Simple Logic of Storable Votes -- 1.1.The Formal Model -- Version 1 -- 1.2.Proof of Proposition 1.1 -- 1.3.Proof of Proposition 1.2 -- 1.4.Construction of the Figures in Chapter 1 -- 2.Storing Votes over Time -- 2.1.The Formal Model -- Version 2 -- 2.2.Proof of Proposition 2.1 -- 2.3.Proof of Proposition 2.2 -- 2.4.Proof of Proposition 2.3 -- 2.5.Three-proposal Games: The Second Election for the Two-voter Game -- 3.Protecting Minorities without Sacrificing Efficiency -- 3.1.The Formal Model -- Version 3 -- 3.2.Proof of Proposition 3.1 -- 3.3.Proof of Proposition 3.2 -- 3.4.Proof of Proposition 3.3 -- 3.5.Derivation and Discussion of Figure 3.1 -- 4.Agenda Control -- 4.1.The Formal Model -- Version 4.1 -- 4.2.Proof of Proposition 4.1 -- 4.3.Proof of Proposition 4.2 -- 4.4.Proof of Proposition 4.3 -- 4.5.Proof of Proposition 4.4 -- 4.6.Equilibria: Experiment 4.1 -- 4.7.The Formal Model -- Version 4.2 -- 4.8.Proof of Result 4.1 -- 4.9.Proof of Result 4.2 -- 4.10.Derivation of Table 4.5 -- 5.Storable Votes in Large Elections -- 5.1.The Formal Model -- Version 5 -- 5.2.Three Preliminary Results -- 5.3.Proof of Proposition 5.1 -- 5.4.Proof of Proposition 5.2 -- 5.5.Proof of Proposition 5.3 -- 5.6.Proof of Proposition 5.4 -- 6.A Field Test of Storable Votes in Large Elections: Student Elections on the Columbia Campus -- 6.1.Testing the Representativeness of the Samples -- 6.2.Measures of Inequality -- Appendix: Experimental Instructions -- A.1.Experiment in Chapter 1 -- A.2.Experiment in Chapter 2 -- A.3.Experiment in Chapter 3 -- A.4.Experiment 4.1 in Chapter 4 -- A.5.Experiment 4.2 in Chapter 4 -- A.6.Experiment in Chapter 6
ER  -