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008			170103s2007 xx o ||||0 eng d
020			_a9780821372678
020			_z9780821372661
040			_aMiAaPQ _beng _erda _epn _cTR-AnTOB _dMiAaPQ
041	0		_aeng
050		4	_aHD9560.6 _bT67 2007
090			_aHD9560.6 _bT67 2007
100	1		_aTordo, Silvana _eauthor _9145278
245	1	0	_aFiscal Systems for Hydrocarbons : _bDesign Issues / _cSilvana Tordo.
264		1	_aHerndon : _bWorld Bank Publications, _c2007.
264		4	_c©2007
300			_a86 pages ; _c26 cm
336			_atext _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_acomputer _bc _2rdamedia
338			_aonline resource _bcr _2rdacarrier
490	0		_aWorld Bank Working Papers
505	0		_aContents -- Abstract -- Acknowledgments -- 1. Introduction -- 2. The Life Cycle of a Petroleum Project -- 3. Legal Arrangements in the Petroleum Industry -- 4. Fiscal Regimes for the Petroleum Sector: Tax and Non-Tax Instruments -- 5. Designing Efficient Fiscal Systems -- 6. Fiscal Systems' Measures and Economic Indicators -- 7. Designing Petroleum Fiscal Systems: Issues to be Considered -- 8. Conclusion -- APPENDIXES -- A Key Elements of Successful Petroleum Legal Frameworks -- B Tax and Non-Tax Components of Petroleum Fiscal Systems -- C Government Take -- D Economic Impact of Alternative Fiscal Parameters -- E Government Take and Project IRR at Different Levels of Cost Recovery Limit -- F Field A, Fiscal Model 1: Alternative Triggers -- G Government Take and Project IRR at Different Price Levels -- H Government Participating Interest -- Bibliography -- LIST OF TABLES -- 1. Key Features of Concessionary and Contractual Systems -- 2. Main Differences between Concessionary Systems and Production Sharing Contracts -- 3. Flexible, Neutral, and Stable Fiscal Regime -- 4. Key Project Parameters -- 5. Fiscal System Indices -- 6. Contractor's and Host Government's NPV Variation -- 7. Break-Even Price -- 8. Royalties -- 9. Ring Fencing -- 10. Corporate Income Tax -- 11. Resource Rent Tax -- 12. Import and Export Duties -- 13. Value Added Tax -- 14. Surface Taxes -- 15. Bonuses -- 16. Government Participation -- 17. Cost Recovery Limit -- 18. Profit Oil Split -- 19. Foreign Exchange Controls -- 20. Environmental Taxes and Bonds, and Other Performance Bonds -- 21. Local Content Obligations -- 22. Economic Impact of Alternative Fiscal Parameters-Field A -- 23. Economic Impact of Alternative Fiscal Parameters-Field B -- 24. Economic Impact of Alternative Fiscal Parameters-Field C -- 25. Economic Impact of Alternative Fiscal Parameters-Field D.
505	8		_a26. Government Participating Interest-Field A -- LIST OF FIGURES -- 1. The Project Cycle -- 2. Petroleum Legal Arrangements -- LIST OF GRAPHS -- 1. Government Take and Project IRR at Different Levels of Cost Recovery Limit-Field A -- 2. Government Take and Project IRR at Different Levels of Cost Recovery Limit-Field B -- 3. Government Take and Project IRR at Different Levels of Cost Recovery Limit-Field C -- 4. Government Take and Project IRR at Different Levels of Cost Recovery Limit-Field D -- 5. Government Take and Project IRR at Different Price Levels-Field A -- 6. Government Take and Project IRR at Different Price Levels-Field B -- 7. Government Take and Project IRR at Different Price Levels-Field C -- 8. Government Take and Project IRR at Different Price Levels-Field D.
520			_aAlthough host governments and investors may share one common objective - the desire for projects to generate high levels off revenue - their other goals are not entirely aligned. Host governments aim to maximize rent for their country over time, while achieving other development and socioeconomic objectives. Investors aim to ensure that the return on investment is consistent with the risk associated with the project, and with their corporations' strategic objectives. To reconcile these often conflicting objectives, more and more countries rely on transparent institutional arrangements and flexible, nuetral fiscal regimes. This paper examines the key elements of the legal and fiscal frameworks utilized in the petroleum sector and aims to outline desirable features that should be considered in the design of fiscal policy with the objective of optimizing the host government's benefits, taking into account the effect this would have on the private sector's investment.
588			_aDescription based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources.
590			_aElectronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, 2017. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries.
650		0	_aPetroleum industry and trade -- Government policy.
655		4	_aElectronic books.
776	0	8	_iPrint version: _aTordo, Silvana _tFiscal Systems for Hydrocarbons : Design Issues _dHerndon : World Bank Publications,c2007 _z9780821372661
797	2		_aProQuest (Firm)
856	4	0	_uhttp://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/iyte/detail.action?docID=459721 _zClick to View
942			_2lcc _cBK