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008 171201s2003 fr i000 0 eng d
035 _a(CKB)3230000000015964
035 _a(FR-PaOEC)864178271805
035 _a(EXLCZ)993230000000015964
035 _a(TR-AnTOB)200447379
040 _aFR-PaOEC
_beng
_erda
_cFR-PaOEC
_dTR-AnTOB
041 0 _aeng
050 4 _aHG4501
_b.C43 2003
090 _aHG4501
_b.C43 2003
100 1 _aCharlton, Andrew,
_q(Andrew Henry George),
_d1978-
_eauthor
_932615
245 1 0 _aIncentive Bidding for Mobile Investment :
_bEconomic Consequences and Potential Responses /
_cAndrew Charlton.
264 1 _aParis :
_bOECD Publishing,
_c2003.
300 _a47 pages ;
_c30 cm
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _aunmediated
_bn
_2rdamedia
338 _avolume
_bnc
_2rdacarrier
490 0 _aOECD Development Centre Working Papers,
_x18151949 ;
_vno.203
520 3 _aCompetition among governments to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) has grown significantly. This paper investigates the extent to which the size of incentive packages offered to investors by governments is driven by competitive pressure to attract mobile investment projects. It finds that such competition is in many cases a significant determinant of the size and nature of investment incentives. Competition can have both positive and negative effects on domestic and international welfare. Negative outcomes typically occur when governments offer attraction packages that are larger than the value of the benefits to the host economy, or when governments resort to inefficient incentive instruments. Increased transparency would significantly reduce the scope for negative welfare outcomes. Proper accounting for incentives helps to ensure that expenditure is aligned with policy goals, reduces the potential for corruption and improves the efficiency of the negotiation process ...
650 0 _aInvestments
_9135499
710 2 _aOrganisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
_933753
762 0 _tWorking paper /
_w(CKB)1000000000489917
_w(DLC)2004242202
_w(OCoLC)56716466
_x1815-1949
942 _2lcc
_cBK